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NOTES
A CN TOWER OVER QATAR: AN ANALYSIS
OF THE USE OF SLAVE LABOR IN
PREPARATION FOR THE 2022 FIFA MEN'S
WORLD CUP AND HOW THE EUROPEAN
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS CAN STOP IT
I. INTRODUCTION

Held every four years, the FIFA World Cup ("World Cup") is an
international soccer tournament sponsored by the F6d6ration
Internationale de Football Association ("FIFA"), which is the governing
body for international soccer.'
Open to all 209 FIFA member
associations, the World Cup is "the biggest single-event sporting
competition in the world." 2 Since the inaugural World Cup in 1930, the
World Cup has been held every four years, except for cancellations of
the 1942 and 1946 editions due to World War II. In the current format
of the World Cup, member associations play matches in preliminary
competitions over three years, in order to determine which thirty-two
associations (including an automatic entry for the hosting association)
shall qualify for the final competition, i.e., the World Cup. 4
The World Cup enables FIFA to raise funds for many soccer-

1. FtDtRATION INTERNATIONALE DE FOOTBALL ASSOCIATION, ALL ABOUT FIFA:
DEVELOP THE GAME, TOUCH THE WORLD, BUILD A BETTER FUTURE 15 (FIFA Comm'ns & Pub.

Affairs Div. ed., F6dration Internationale de Football Association 2012), available at
http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/fifafacts/organisation/02/13/11/06/03072
013allaboutfifa-neutral.pdf.
2. FIFA
Associations,
FIFA.COM,
http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/organisation/associations.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2014); FIFA
World Cup, FIFA.COM, http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/worldcup/index.html (last visited Oct. 25,
2013).
3. FIFA World Cup, supra note 2.
4. See id.

177

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2014

1

Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal, Vol. 32, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 5
178

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 32:177

centric and otherwise philanthropic, initiatives worldwide. For instance,
in conjunction with the 2010 edition of the World Cup, which was held
in South Africa, FIFA launched its "20 Centres for 2010" campaign,
aiming to promote public health, education, and soccer in disadvantaged
communities across Africa.' To support financing for the World Cup
and FIFA's consequent social programs, FIFA relies on sponsorships,
television rights, ticket sales, and concessions.6 The 2010 World Cup
was broadcast to 204 countries on 245 different television channels,
while hosting more than 3.17 million spectators within the South African
stadia, as well as an additional six million people who frequented one of
sixteen official public viewing sites 7 -of which ten were located in
South Africa, along with one each in Rome, Italy; Paris, France; Berlin,
Germany; Sydney, Australia; Mexico City, Mexico; and Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil.i According to FIFA's own statistics, the 2010 World Cup also
sold more than 750,000 liters of beer and 390,600 hot dogs. 9
By virtue of a secret ballot held in Zurich, Switzerland, on
December 2, 2010, it was announced that Qatar would host the 2022
World Cup, prevailing over four rival prospective host associations: the
United States, Australia, Japan, and South Korea.io As a result, the 2022
World Cup is slated to be "the first global sporting event ever to be
hosted in the Middle East."" To date, Qatar has never qualified for a
World Cup; in fact, their honors are limited to a runner-up finish in the
1981 FIFA U-20 World Cup Final, third place in the 2011 FIFA Club
World Cup, and fourth place in the FIFA U-17 World Cup Final. 12 As

5. Id.
6. See Jonathan Watts, World Cup venues awaitfinal safety checks as teams prepare to fly
out, THE GUARDIAN (May 23, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/football/2014/may/23/world-cupvenue-brazil-safety-checks.
7. FIFA World Cup, supra note 2; see FtDtRATION INTERNATIONALE DE FOOTBALL
ASSOCIATION, 2014 FIFA WORLD CUP BRAZIL: FIFA REGULATIONS FOR PUBLIC VIEWING EVENTS
1,
available
at

http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/toumament/loc/02/08/63/33/fifaregulationsforpublicviewingeve
nts%5ffwc2014%5fneutral.pdf (defining "public viewing event" as a place where "broadcast
coverage of the Competition is made available for exhibition to, and viewing by, an audience
(whether members of the general public or otherwise) in any place other than a private dwelling").
8. FIFA World Cup, supra note 2.
9. Id.
10. 2022 FIFA World Cup awarded to Qatar, FIFA.COM (Dec. 2, 2010),
http://www.fifa.com/newscentre/news/newsid=1 344500/index.html.
11. Bidders
for
the
2022
FIFA
World
Cup:
Qatar,
http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/qatar2022/bidders/qatar.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2013).
12. Qatar:
FIFA/Coca-Cola
World
Ranking,
FIFA.COM,
http://www.fifa.com/associations/association=qat/ranking/gender-m/index.htm (last visited June
15, 2014).
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of June 2014, the Qatari men's soccer association was ranked 100th
among FIFA associations.13 If this ranking were to remain valid in
2022, Qatar would be one of the, if not the, lowest-ranked associations
to ever host the World Cup. 14 By comparison, South Africa was ranked
fifty-first (51st) in 2010, the year in which that association hosted the
World Cup.'5 Aside from that automatic World Cup appearance, South

Africa qualified, by virtue of merit, for the 1998 and 2002 World Cups.' 6
By further comparison, Russia, the designated host association for the
2018 World Cup, is currently ranked nineteenth (19th), with ten previous
World Cup qualifications, including its prior history as the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics.1 7
Consistent with FIFA's stated objectives for the World Cup,
namely, that it "fulfill[] FIFA's objectives to touch the world, develop
the game, and build a better future through a variety of ways,"" Qatar
pitched a 2022 World Cup hosting as "compact - to the benefit of the
fans, FIFA, and the environment." 19 Qatar, in its pitch, pledged to use
"[r]enewable technologies and architecturally advanced venues and
facilities built to the highest environmental standards [in order to] ensure
[that] players and fans alike enjoy each match in a cool
environment 2 0 . . . [by] using and developing eco-friendly technologies
for stadiums that can then be adopted in other countries." 2 1 As a main
feature of this plan, Qatar proposed modular stadia that, in collaboration

13. Id. (showing that associations' rankings within FIFA are updated monthly, but that at the
conclusion of each year, the monthly rankings are aggregated to formulate yearly rankings).
14. See generally, FIFA Associations, supra note 2 (follow the respective hyperlink for any
member association, with rankings available from 1993 to the present).
15. South
Africa:
FIFA/Coca-Cola
World
Ranking,
FIFA.coM,
http://www.fifa.com/associations/association=rsa/ranking/gender-m/index.html
(last visited Oct.
25, 2013).
16. Id.
17. 2018
FIFA
World
Cup
Russia,
FIFA.CoM,
http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/russia20l8/destination/hostcountry/index.html (last visited Oct. 16,
2014);
Russia:
FIFA/Coca-Cola
World
Ranking,
FIFA.COM,
http://www.fifa.com/associations/association=rus/ranking/gender---m/index.html (last visited June
15, 2014).
18. FIFA World Cup, supra note 2.
19. Biddersfor the 2022 FIFA World Cup: Qatar,supra note 11.
20. Id.; see also Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: FIFA and the World Cup (HBO
television broadcast June 8, 2014), available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-D1JEt2KU331.
See

generally,

e.g.,

Average

Temperature and Rain

Fall in

Qatar, USA

TODAY,

http://traveltips.usatoday.coml/average-temperature-rain-fall-qatar-13455.html (last visited Dec. 22,
2013) (estimating that a typical summer day in Qatar may see outdoor temperatures as high as l14F
(45.60 C), with nighttime lows of approximately 84oF (28.9'C)).
21. Biddersfor the 2022 FIFA World Cup: Qatar, supra note 11.
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with Reach Out To Asia,2 2 could be re-erected in part as stand modules
in other Asian countries, thus consequently shrinking the World Cup
stadia in Qatar to smaller sizes for permanent use.23
A significant amount of labor controversy has already resulted from
FIFA's selecting Qatar as the host association of the 2022 World Cup. 2 4
One such controversy implicates the inherent construction industry, as
Qatar prepares to erect new infrastructures to accommodate the players
and the spectators who will all, necessarily, be present within Qatar's
borders. 25 A recent story, 26 as reported by The Guardian, suggests that
Qatari construction firms, in furtherance of the need to erect stadia,
hotels, and even entire cities for the World Cup, are utilizing labor
consistent with the International Labour Organization's ("ILO")
definition of modern slavery.27 This market for slave labor exploits
large communities of migrant workers, with a significant portion hailing
from Nepal and saddled with exorbitant personal debt.2 8
This
investigation is among the background material that shall be presented in
Part II.A of this note.
In order to analyze which causes of action and remedies are
available to the aggrieved migrant workers, it must be determined
whether internal FIFA law serves as the "default," and whether or not
there are any scenarios in which the default can be overridden. Part II.B
of this note will then determine if any United Nations ("UN") provision
can serve to override current World Cup labor law. With respect to the
slave laborers currently working to build the 2022 World Cup in Qatar,
this note shall inquire as to whether any human rights violations-as per
the United Nations29-have occurred and whether or not FIFA's status
as a Swiss corporation or Qatar's status as a United Nations member
may influence the outcome of this scenario, by treaty, convention, or

22.

See generally About Us, REACH OUT To ASIA, http://www.reachouttoasia.org/en (last

visited Nov. 10, 2013). Reach Out To Asia is a non-governmental organization, operating within
the framework of the non-profit Qatar Foundation, that facilitates access to higher-quality education
to the rest of the Middle East and Asia.
23. Bidders for the 2022 FIFA World Cup: Qatar, supra note 11.
24. See E:60: Qatar's World Cup (ESPN television broadcast June 1, 2014), available at
http://espn.go.com/video/clip?id=l11019010.
25. See id.
26.

See Pete Pattisson, Revealed: Qatar's World Cup 'slaves', THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 25,

2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/25/revealed-qatars-world-cup-slaves.
27.

Id.; See also Questions and answers onforced labour, infra note 56.

28. See Pattisson, supra note 26.
29. See generally Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (1II) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(111)
(Dec.
10,
1948)
[hereinafter
UDHR],
available
at
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/.
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otherwise.
After addressing the relevant UN angles and determining the
relevant jurisdiction, Parts III and IV et seq. of this note will analyze
whether the relevant labor law can provide remedies to the slave
laborers; namely, which legal venue would be available for the slave
laborers to bring a cause of action and which parties could be named as
defendants. After fully analyzing the legal issues surrounding the World
Cup slave labor within Qatar, Part V of this note will address recent
responses that FIFA has made in order to address the plight of the slave
laborers. Finally, this note will conclude in Part VI with a set of
recommendations as how to further FIFA's plans for the 2022 World
Cup, while preserving as many substantive rights for the slave laborers
as possible.30
II. PLIGHT OF THE SLAVE LABORERS

A. InitialInvestigations
According to Pete Pattisson's article in The Guardian, dated
September 25, 2013, thousands of Nepalese migrant workers employed
in Qatar for World Cup preparations have endured appalling labor
abuses 31 and many workers have literally been worked to death, from
Nepal and other countries. 32 (In order to simplify the analysis of this
30. It should also be noted that, from the perspective of the players, there is the stifling truth
that a summer World Cup in Qatar would have to be played in extreme heat. This would likely
result in an unsafe working condition-not just for the soccer players, but also for the coaches and
training staff that each soccer federation employs and would be sending to Qatar-by virtue of
leaving these actors vulnerable to heat stroke, dehydration, and other injuries that could arise from
the desert climate. A "simple" rescheduling in favor of February or November would be rife with
its own complications, as such a move would be materially adverse not only to the domestic leagues
that normally employ the World Cup participants (the domestic leagues would be coerced into
placing their seasons on hiatus, to the detriment of their respective revenue streams), but to every
contract that was signed under the assumption that the World Cup would maintain its lifelong status
quo. These contracts were undoubtedly secured under the assumption that the 2022 World Cup
would be held during the summer of a non-summer Olympic, even-numbered year, which has not
only been true for every previous iteration of the World Cup, but seemingly independent of FIFA's
eventual decision as to the event's location. This dilemma, though relevant in a labor and
employment context, shall not be addressed by this note. Analyses with respect to duties owed to
fans and other third parties, on the grounds of having no labor or employment connection to the
World Cup, shall be beyond the scope of this note.
31. Pattisson, supra note 26.
32. See, e.g., id.; Agence France-Presse, 2022 FIFA World Cup: RTI reveals more than 450
Indian migrants deaths in Qatar in 2012-13, NDTV SPORTS (Feb. 19, 2014, 18:00 IST),
http://sports.ndty.com/football/news/221081-2022-fifa-world-cup-rti-reveals-more-than-450-indianmigrants-deaths-in-qatar-in-2012-13 (reporting that migrant workers in Qatar who hailed from India
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note and to avoid needless redundancies, it shall be assumed that
similarly situated migrant workers in Qatar, but of national origins other
than of Nepal, can and will assert the same causes of action, through the
same fora, as the Nepalese.) With respect only to the migrant Nepalese
in Qatar, post-Pattisson reporting by the BBC counted 185 deaths among
migrant workers in Qatar in 2013.33 Pattisson's initial reporting found
that from June 4 to August 8, 2013, there were forty-four documented
deaths among the workers, according to documentation obtained from
the Nepalese embassy located in Doha, Qatar.3 4 Another report by
ESPN's Jeremy Schaap, corroborated the BBC's findings, while adding
that 680 Nepali migrant workers have died in Qatar over the five years
preceding his report.
Finally, the International Trade Union
Confederation's ("ITUC") General Secretary, Sharan Burrow,
"conservatively" estimated that more than 4,000 migrant workers will
die "before a ball is kicked off in 2022," from Nepal and India alone.36
Of these forty-four particular occurrences, half of the workers died
of heart attacks, heart failure, or workplace accidents.3 7 Mr. Schaap's
report asserts that cardiac arrest is the official cause of death most often
attributed to migrant workers' deaths in Qatar, while workplace
accidents and suicides contributing to these figures.
The Guardian's
investigation also revealed allegations of policies such as withholding
months' worth of pay, confiscating workers' passports, failing to provide
work-issued identification cards, and even denying drinking water to the
workers on duty-despite being in 500 C (122oF) temperature.39 In the
same investigation, The Guardian found at least one instance of twelve
workers crammed in one room, which facilitated the spread of disease
within the supplied "housing accommodations." 4 0 These deficiencies are
inherent to Qatar's kafala system, in which companies "sponsor" their
workers and are thus able to unilaterally grant or withhold permission
for a worker to find alternative employment.41 In the kafala system,
employees' every behavior is owned by his employer, who in turn has

also died).
33. See Richard Conway, Qatar 2022: Plans to protect World Cup workers unveiled, BBC
(Feb. 11, 2014, 14:47 GMT), http://www.bbc.com/sport/O/football/26131986.
34. Pattisson, supra note 26.
35. E:60: Qatar's World Cup, supra note 24.
36. Id
37. Pattisson, supra note 26.
38. E:60: Qatar's World Cup, supra note 24.
39. Pattisson, supra note 26.
40. See id
41. See id
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the sole power to grant or withhold an exit visa, so that a migrant worker
may elect to return to his native country.42 The Guardian also obtained a
graphic anecdote from a twenty-seven-year-old Ram Kumar Mahara,
who recalled "working on an empty stomach for 24 hours; 12 hours'
work and then no food all night.4 3 When I complained, my manager
assaulted me, kicked me out of the labour camp I lived in and refused to
pay me anything.44 I had to beg for food from other workers."s
The Guardian explains that most of the Nepalese migrant workers
have incurred substantial personal debt (with interest rates as high as
thirty-six percent)46 stemming from having to pay recruitment agents for
their services in procuring these very jobs.47 Since the employers
routinely withhold wages, the workers are unable to make payments to
satisfy their debts.48 Furthermore, the fact that the workers possess no
form of identification (having had their passports confiscated and being
without work-issued identification) 49 means that the workers are not free
to leave their places of employment; without identification, the workers
would have a similar status as illegal aliens within Qatar, being
arrestable, deportable, and unentitled to any legal protection.50
One such Nepalese migrant, who, at the time of the Guardian
article, was employed in the erection of Lusail City-a forty-five billion
dollar project to build the Qatari City that is slated to host the 2022
World Cup final, as well as the ninety thousand-seat stadium in which
the final is scheduled to be played-lamented that "[w]e'd like to leave,
but the company won't let us. I'm angry about how this company is
treating us, but we're helpless. I regret coming here, but what to do?
We were compelled to come just to make a living, but we've had no
luck."5 1 Another Lusail City laborer, identified only as SBD, disclosed
that "[t]he company has kept two months' salary from each of us to stop
us running away," 5 2 while a third anonymous worker added that "[i]f we
run away, we become illegal and that makes it hard to find another job[,]
[t]he police could catch us at any time and send us back home [and] [w]e

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

E:60: Qatar'sWorld Cup, supra note 24.
Pattisson, supra note 26.
Id
Id
Id.
Id
See id
See id
See id
Id.
Id.
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can't get a resident permit if we leave."5 3
Nepalese ambassador to Qatar, Maya Kumari Sharma, likened the
conditions to "an open jail,"54 from which approximately thirty Nepalese
citizens sought refuge by travelling to the Nepalese embassy in Doha.s"
Upon first impression, these qualities do, in fact, appear to be consistent
with the ILO's definition of "forced labour," which includes the full
spectrum of human trafficking abuses, with the exceptions of (a)
trafficking for the purpose of organ removal and (b) cases of forced
marriage or adoption that do not subsequently lead to forced labor.56
The ILO differentiates forced labour from sub-standard or exploitive
working conditions by recognizing "[v]arious indicators [that] can be
used to ascertain when a situation amounts to forced labour, such as
restrictions on workers' freedom of movement, withholding of wages or
identity documents, physical or sexual violence, threats and intimidation
or fraudulent debt from which workers cannot escape."5
The ILO
further specifies that "[i]n addition to being a serious violation of
fundamental human rights, the exaction of forced labour is a criminal
offence."
B. UnitedNations Provisionsat Odds with Nepalese Laborers'
Treatment in Qatar
Assuming that this systemic disparate treatment of the Nepalese
migrant workers in Qatar, as recounted by The Guardian and other
outlets is true, it appears that several provisions of the United Nations'
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 60 ("UDHR") may have been
violated. The UDHR, in relevant parts, states that
No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade

53. Id.
54. Id; see also Envoy Shanna in soup, THE HIMALAYAN TIMES (May 10, 2013, 11:05 PM),
http://www.thehimalayantimes.com/fullNews.php?headline=Envoy+Sharma+in+soup+&NewsD=3
75975
55. Pattisson, supranote 26.
56.

See Questions and answers on forced labour, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION

(June
1,
2012),
http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/newsroom/commentanalysis/WCMS_181922/lang-en/index.htm.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See Pattisson, supranote 26; E:60: Qatar's World Cup, supranote 24.
60. See UDHR, supra note 29, at Art. 4, 8, 13(1), 13(2), 23(1), 23(2), 23(3).
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shall be prohibited in all their forms.61

... Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent
national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him
by the constitution or by law. 62

. . Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence
within the borders of each state.
Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to
return to his country. 64

... Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to
just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against
unemployment.65
Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for
equal work. 66

Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration
ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human
dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social
protection. 67

Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the
68
protection of his interests.
Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at Art.
Id. at Art.
Id. at Art.
Id. at Art.
Id. at Art.
Id. at Art.
Id. at Art.
Id. at Art.

4.
8.
13(1).
13(2).
23(1).
23(2).
23(3).
23(4).
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limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay.
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health
and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing,
housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right
to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability,
widowhood, old aAe or other lack of livelihood in circumstances
beyond his control.
It is worth noting that the UDHR is written with the intent to be
applicable to all individuals.71 Assuming arguendo that the UDHR
should, in fact, only apply to countries who are members of the United
Nations, then it would follow that all relevant parties herein were
obligated to abide by the UDHR: Switzerland (the country in which
FIFA is domiciled as a corporation), Qatar (the country in which these
allegations of slave labor have arisen), and Nepal (the country from
which these slave laborers claim citizenship) have all been members of
the UN since FIFA awarded the 2022 World Cup to Qatar.72
With respect to UDHR Article 4 specifically, this note shall draw
upon the European Court of Human Rights ("ECHR") case law to
demonstrate how the Nepalese workers' arrangements match other
confirmed instances of slavery and forced labor," which shall, in turn,
equate the Nepalese laborers' lack of a work-issued identification to a
factor of forced labor, as well as an Article 13 violation by itself. By
demonstrating the presence of these UDHR violations upon the Nepalese
who are working in Qatar, it shall then be argued that Article 8 affords
them the right to be heard before a "competent national tribunal."74

69. Id. at Art. 24.
70. Id. at Art. 25(l).
71. Compare id. at Pmbl ("Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter
reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person
and in the equal rights of men and women and have determined to promote social progress and
better standards of life in larger freedom ....
), with id at Art. 1 ("All human beings are bom free
and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act
towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood."), and id at Art. 2 ("Everyone is entitled to all the
rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, . . . .").
72.

See United Nations Member States, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/members/

(last visited Feb. 17, 2014) (noting that the dates of admission for Switzerland, Qatar, and Nepal,
respectively, were in the years 2002, 1971, and 1955, and that all of these dates precede Qatar's
accepted bid for the 2022 World Cup).
73. See generally C.N. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 4239/08 (2012), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001 -114518.
74. UDHR, supra note 29, at Art. 8.
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Ideally, this "competent national tribunal" will be that of Switzerland,
due to the fact that the ECHR has a binding effect on the Swiss court
system," which would, accordingly, enjoin FIFA from enabling future
slave labor violations, no matter where future World Cup construction
may take place.
III. CHOICE OF LAW AND FORUM
A. CircumventingFIFA Defaults ofAgency Law and Arbitration

As stipulated in Article 1 of the FIFA Statutes, FIFA "is an
association registered in the Commercial Register in accordance with art.
60 ff. of the Swiss Civil Code" 76 and it is headquartered in Zurich,
Switzerland. 7 Parts VII and VIII of the FIFA Statutes (concerning
"Arbitration" and "Submission of Decisions to FIFA," respectively,
while collectively spanning Articles 66 through 70) comprise the judicial
process that FIFA makes available.78 In relevant parts, the FIFA Statutes
dictate that the Court of Arbitration for Sport ("CAS"), which is located
in Lausanne, Switzerland, shall "resolve disputes between FIFA,
Members, Confederations, Leagues, Clubs, Players, Officials, and
licensed match agents and players' agents." 79 CAS, in these cases, is
instructed to apply FIFA regulations and Swiss law, while following the
provisions of the CAS Code of Sports-related Arbitration.80
Furthermore, CAS shall only have jurisdiction by appeal within twentyone days of an internal FIFA decision," if all internal judicial avenues
within FIFA have been exhausted beforehand 82 and if the matter is not of
a particular delineated exceptions for which CAS is specifically barred
from hearing the dispute.

75. See THE PATHS TO THE Swiss FEDERAL SUPREME COURT: AN OUTLINE OF
SWITZERLAND'S JUDICIARY STRUCTURE 23 (Swiss Federal Supreme Court 2013) [hereinafter THE

PATHS], available at http://www.bger.ch/fr/wege zum bundesgericht e.pdf.
76. FtDtRATION INTERNATIONALE DE FOOTBALL ASSOCIATION, FIFA Statutes: Regulations
Governing the Application of the Statutes Standing Orders of the Congress, FIFA 6 (July 2013)

[hereinafter
FIFA
Statutes],
http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/AFFederation/Generic/02/14/97/88/FIFAStatuten2013_ENeutr
al.pdf
77.
Id.
78. See id at 47-50.
79. Id. at 47.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See id. at 47-48.
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Article 68 of FIFA Statutes specifically appears to limit the
potential for legal recourse beyond internal FIFA decisions by
proclaiming that "[r]ecourse to ordinary courts of law is prohibited
unless specifically provided for in the FIFA regulations,"84 and by
otherwise greatly favoring arbitration in lieu of ordinary courts of law,
e.g. by obligating countries' associations to eschew ordinary courts of
law and by reserving the right to move any appeal that was filed in an
ordinary court of law to arbitration." Even though "ordinary court of
law" is not specifically defined within FIFA Statutes, it can be implied
from the context of the statutes, as a whole, that "ordinary court of law"
is meant to identify any non-arbitration forum not specifically mentioned
in FIFA Statutes.86 For the purpose of this note, "ordinary court of law"
shall be used accordingly.
On the other hand, a reasonable interpretation of FIFA's preapproved scheme of internal decisions and arbitration, as delineated by
the Statutes, may lead to the conclusion that internal decisions and
arbitration only govern questions closely related to soccer. This way,
more typical FIFA questions, such as, "Is Player X, who was born in
Country A to two parents of Nationality B, eligible to choose which
FIFA member association shall receive his services, for the purpose of
World Cup qualifying and other international soccer affairs?" or "Is
Nation P, which is currently holding a referendum for its independence
from Country Q, eligible to join FIFA as its own Member Association P,
separate from that of Country Q?" may be decided expeditiously by
judicial bodies with necessary expertise in the sports-centric matters.
At a minimum, it would appear that FIFA's network of internal
decision making and any subsequent arbitration as a result, would
govern outdoor temperatures as they would affect the players and the
soccer matches.
From the players' perspective, outdoor temperatures
would likely qualify as an example of a game condition and, by natural
extension, be considered a more sports-centric matter. If this were to be
the limit of FIFA's jurisdictional reach, then the arbitration mandate
would be less likely to restrict the laborers' avenues for recourse. This is
because outdoor temperatures' effects on laborers, as opposed to players,

84.
85.
86.
ambiguity
context in
87.

Id. at 48.
See id. at 48-9.
See generally Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997) ("The plainness or
of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific
which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.").
FIFA Statutes, supra note 76, at 57 (allowing FIFA to make further provisions for not

stated in their by-laws for matches).
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would be less likely to be classified as a sports-centric matter. A more
limited reading of FIFA's administrative authority would likely be of
greater benefit to the laborers because the laborers would, accordingly,
be more likely to gain access to the European Court of Human Rights for
redress, despite FIFA's reluctance to authorize jurisdiction to an
ordinary court of law such as this one.
If severable from FIFA's mandate of arbitration on the grounds of
not being a soccer matter, the slave laborers might be able to seek relief
through Switzerland's court system,89 although it would necessarily start
with a conciliation authority. 90 Assuming that FIFA would assert that
ordinary courts of law lack jurisdiction, as stipulated within the
Statutes, 91 it is not likely that a resolution would be achieved through the
conciliation authority. Accordingly, the next step within the Swiss
judicial system would be the Civil Court of First Instance, where the
matter would probably be transferred to the Zurich Canton Labour
Court 92 on the grounds of requiring special expertise on labor law from
the court system.93 This initial decision would then be appealable to the
Civil Court of Second Instance and then, finally, to the Federal Supreme
Court of Switzerland.94
The Federal Supreme Court, while tasked with upholding the
Constitution of Switzerland, is specifically bound by international law
with respect to the law of nations and human rights, by virtue of the
ECHR and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 95
Due to the supremacy of the ECHR, if the slave laborers were to be able
to articulate a claim in the Swiss court system, this would represent the
best possible scenario to obtain a judgment against FIFA and a remedy.
This strategy, if successful, would be more likely to be binding upon
FIFA in future World Cups, due to FIFA's headquarters within
Switzerland. 9 6
If, however, this strategy of binding FIFA to ECHR jurisprudence
and the UDHR were to be deemed inapplicable, then the laborers would
probably have to resort to Qatari law, in order to pursue monetary
88.
89.
DIGEST
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

See id. at 48 (disallowing recourse to ordinary courts of law).
See generally Switzerland Law Digest, Courts and Legislatures 1 Martindale-Hubbell
§ 6.01.
See THE PATHS, supra note 75, at 7, 24.
See FIFA Statutes, supra note 76, at 47.
See THE PATHS, supranote 75, at 7, 9, 24.
See id at 9.
See id at 7-8, 10.
See id at 23.
FIFA Statutes, supranote 76, at 6.
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compensation. Standing in a Qatari lawsuit may be relatively easy to
establish because Qatari law would undisputedly govern allegations of
wrongdoing within Qatar's borders.97 On the other hand, a verdict based
on Qatari law would be less desirable for future oppressed groups of
people in similar slave labor plights because Qatari jurisprudence would
not have precedential value via the ECHR. Furthermore, given the
magnitude of the Nepaleses' ordeals in Qatar, they may simply be
unwilling to seek justice in Qatar, if they should be concerned that their
trials would be biased against them. For these reasons, it shall be
assumed that the most desirable verdict for these slave laborers and all
similarly situated people in future like scenarios, would arise from the
ECHR, if this should be possible.
B. Applicability ofForumsfor Slave Laborers, Assuming They May Sue
in Court
If the laborers can establish their case as applicable under Swiss
law, the workers would be able to take advantage of the ECHR, due to
the Swiss Supreme Court's deference to it.98

This would be an

extraordinary outcome, seeing that these laborers have not worked in a
European Union member country. Because Switzerland is a jurisdiction
with civil law jurisprudence, arguments to extend precedents to new
classes of individuals would likely be rendered moot, despite the fact
that such a pleading could be plausible in a common law country like the
United States. 99 Accordingly, civil law cases must be read to extract
applicable law that the slave laborers in Qatar might be able to utilize to
their advantage.
IV. ECHR AS THE SLAVE LABORERS' PREFERRED FORUM
A. Case Law
1. Forced Labor, as Seen via the Facts Within CN v. United Kingdom
C.N. v. United Kingdom'0 0 is an ECHR decision that addresses
97.

See CODE CIVIL Art. 10, 12 (Qatar).

98.
99.

See THE PATHS, supra note 75, at 23.
See Civil Law vs. Common Law, DIFFEN, http://www.diffen.com/difference/CivilLaw

vsCommonLaw (last visited Oct. 14, 2014).
100. See C.N. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 4239/08
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001 -114518.
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forced labor, which, as previously mentioned in this note, is an adverse
condition recognized by the ILO.' In this case, C.N.1 02 was a refugee
from Uganda, who had moved to the United Kingdom ("UK") on
September 2, 2002.103 She sought refuge from sexual and physical
violence inflicted upon her in Uganda (including, but not limited to,
"several" episodes of rape) and she desired to work to support herself
while in the UK.1 0 4 C.N. was assisted in her relocation from Uganda to
the UK by her relative named S., as well as an unrelated Mr. A., who
conspired to produce a false passport and a visa that enabled C.N. to
enter the UK. 0 5 According to C.N., S. seized these documents upon
C.N.'s arrival in the UK and never returned them to her.' 06 For the rest
of the 2002 calendar year, C.N. lived in various houses in London that S.
owned, albeit under consistent warnings "not [to] talk to people
[because] she could easily be arrested or otherwise come to harm in
London."

07

C.N.'s first job within the UK came to fruition in January 2003,
upon C.N.'s introduction to a man called M., which S. facilitated.' 8 M.
owned a for-profit business providing caregivers and security personnel
to his clientele.' 0 9 After attending a short training course, C.N. worked
some overnight shifts as a caregiver and as a security guard in a number
of locations.11 0 According to C.N., each time a client paid M. for
services that she rendered for his company, M. transferred a share of the
money to S.'s bank account."' It was assumed that S. would give her
this money, but C.N. claims never to have received any money for the
work performed for M..11 2
In early 2003, C.N. commenced her work as a live-in caregiver for
an elderly Iraqi couple, herein named Mr. and Mrs. K..11 3 C.N. felt that
she was permanently on-call to Mr. K.; as he suffered from Parkinson's
disease, C.N. was required to change his clothing, feed him, clean him,
101.

See Questions and answers onforced labour, supra note 56.

102. See CN., App. No. 4239/08, at 1 (stating that Applicant's request for anonymity was
granted, invoking Rule § 47(3) of the Rules of Court).
103. Id. at 1.
104. Id
105. Id. at 2.
106. Id
107. Id. at 2.
108. Id..
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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and lift him as necessary.1 14 C.N. was afforded a couple hours of leave
on one Sunday each month, but during her time off, she would usually
be collected by M. and driven to S.'s house for that afternoon.' 15 Over
time, C.N. would eventually be granted permission to take public
transportation, but she was warned that "it was not safe" and that "she
should not speak with anyone."' 16 In a payment scheme similar to that
which was in effect in 2002, Mr. and Mrs. K. paid M. f1,600
(approximately $2,600 USD) 17 by check every month for the services
that C.N. provided to the couple, of which S. received a portion.' 18 C.N.
claimed that even though, on occasion, she would be gifted presents or
second-hand clothes directly from Mr. and Mrs. K., and that, from time
to time, S. would give C.N. £20 or £40 ($33 or $66 USD)l 9 when she
went to his home on her monthly time off on a Sunday, she never
received "significant payment" for her labor. 120
C.N.'s tales of de facto slavery continued in August 2006, when
Mr. and Mrs. K. went on a family trip to Egypt. 12 1 C.N.'s passport still
lay with S.; therefore, she was unable to accompany her clients on their
travels.122 To pass the time during which C.N. could not render her
services to Mr. and Mrs. K., C.N. was boarded in a house that S.
owned. 123 During that time, S. left for a business trip to Uganda, so S.'s
partner, H., stayed in the house with C.N., effectively preventing C.N.
from leaving the house, and echoed all previous warnings to C.N. that
she should not speak with anyone.124
On August 18, C.N. finally left the house and entered a local bank,
where she asked someone to call the police. 12 5 Before the police arrived,
C.N. collapsed and was taken to a hospital, where she was diagnosed as
HIV-positive and where it was determined that she was suffering from
psychosis, including auditory hallucinations. 12 6 C.N. remained in the
hospital for one month thereafter, during which H. visited her and
114.
115.
116.

Id.
Id
Id.

117.

Id.; see Currency Converter, http://www.oanda.com/currency/converter/ (last visited Jan.

21,2014).
118. See C.N., App. No. 4239/08, at 2.
119.

Id.; see Currency Converter, supra note 117.

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

See C.N., App. No. 4239/08, at 2.
Id. at 2.
Id
See id.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id
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attempted to persuade her to return to S.'s house, including by
threatening C.N. that she would have to pay for anti-retroviral
medications upon her discharge and that her failure to return to the house
would result in her being "on the streets."l27
Following her discharge, C.N. was housed by the local authority."2
On September 21, 2006, C.N. made an application for asylum to the
United Kingdom, on the basis of sexually motivated attacks in her native
country of Uganda.1 29 This application was denied on January 16,
2007;130 an immigration judge heard her subsequent appeal and
dismissed it, i.e., affirmed the Home Department's decision in refusing
C.N.'s asylum, on November 20, 2007.131 Meanwhile, C.N.'s solicitor
wrote a letter to the UK police, asking the police to launch an
investigation as to whether C.N. was a victim of a criminal offense, 13 2
namely of a human trafficking enterprise.1 33 At this time, Section 4 of
the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc.) Act 2004
("Section 4 (2004)") was the legislation that represented C.N.'s most
likely avenue for redress in the courts. 13 4 Even though a police
investigation 3 5 and a consultation with the United Kingdom Human
Trafficking Centre in Sheffield1 36 yielded "insufficient evidence to
substantiate the allegation of trafficking" and a resultant termination, 13 7
this did not necessarily foreclose the possibility of prosecutions for other
offenses, including ajus cogens offense of slavery or forced labor.1 3 8
On December 18, 2008, C.N. was assessed by the POPPY Project,
which is a UK government-funded project providing housing and
support for victims of trafficking. 139 The POPPY Project concluded that
C.N. had been "'subjected to five of the six indicators of forced labour'
(as identified by the ILO)."l40 In reaching the above conclusion in
C.N.'s specific case, the POPPY Project found that her movement was

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id
See Id at 6-7.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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restricted to the workplace,141 her wages were withheld to pay a debt that
was unknown to her, 14 2 her salary was withheld for four years,1 4 3 her
passport was retained,'" and she was subjected to threats of
denunciation to the authorities.1 4 5
The police accepted the POPPY Project's findings and began to
conduct further investigations, effective January 5, 2009.146 On the
fourteenth, the police found that a statement had been obtained from an
employment agent, whom the court presumed to be M., in which the
agent stated that "he had been introduced to [C.N.] by a person he
believed to be her relative," 47 which would not be inconsistent with
C.N.'s relationship with S. According to the statement that the agent
produced, C.N. initially agreed that her wages should be paid to S.; in
fact, she only complained about this arrangement in or around June
2006.148 The agent added that he feared "the relative, who was a
wealthy and powerful man well-connected to the Ugandan
government." 4 9
On February 25, 2009, the police once again confirmed that the
evidence still did not establish an offense of trafficking,' 50 but they
further noted that "at this stage there is no evidence that would support
exploitation of any kind.""' A meeting among C.N., her solicitor, and
the police, which took place on March 11, 2009, yielded a provisional
opinion-given expressly without formal authority of the Metropolitan
Police-that even though C.N.'s case was previously handled cursorily
and that her account was credible, there was no offense in English
criminal law which applied to the facts of the case.1 52 In this meeting,
the solicitor specifically mentioned the fact that C.N.'s identity
documents, which were used to gain entry into the United Kingdom,
were being withheld by S. and opined that this was grounds to prove
possible forced labor.' 53 In response to this suggestion, the police

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id at 4, 9 (quoting the relevant ILO indicator directly in the text of the opinion).
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id at 4.
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id. at 5.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol32/iss1/5

18

Engle: A <i>CN</i> Tower Over Qatar: An Analysis of the Use of Slave Lab
A CN TOWER OVER QATAR

2014]

195

informed the solicitor that the documents were forgeries.154
The police later communicated to C.N.'s solicitor that even though,
regrettably, some enquiries were unable to be carried out, such as
production orders relating to relevant bank accounts, the Human
Trafficking Team had limited resources that were, in fact, used to best
effect and that they could not carry out any further investigation into
C.N.'s complaints.155 Despite a clinical psychologist's report that C.N.
was "suffering to a severe degree from a complex form of chronic PostTraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), in conjunction with a Major
Depressive Disorder"' 5 6 while presenting a moderate risk of suicide "in
ways consistent with a victim of trafficking and forced labour, in the
context of a history of sexual assaults,"

57

the police wrote

to C.N.'s

solicitor to confirm that "this particular case does not fulfil [sic] the
requirements of human trafficking as per UK legislation and that
legislation does not exist in relation to sole and specific allegations of
domestic servitude where trafficking is not a factor." 59
While all of the previous investigations were centered around, and
doomed to fail under, Section 4 (2004),160 C.N.'s fortunes changed with
the passing of Section 71 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 ("Section
71 (2009)").161 Section 71 (2009) received Royal Assent on November
12, 2009, and went into effect April 6 of the following year, even though
it did not have retrospective effect.1 62 With respect to slavery, servitude,
or forced or compulsory labor, Section 71 (2009) holds as follows:
(1) A person (D) commits an offence if(a) D holds another person in slavery or servitude and the
circumstances are such that D knows or ought to know that the
person is so held, or
(b) D requires another person to perform forced or compulsory
labour and the circumstances are such that D knows or ought to
know that the person is being required to perform such labour.

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 5.
See id. at 3-4, 6.
See id. at 7.
Id. at 6.
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(2) In subsection (1) the references to holding a person in slavery or
servitude or requiring a person to perform forced or compulsory labour
are to be construed in accordance with Article 4 of the Human Rights
Conventionl63 (which prohibits a person from being held in slavery or
servitude or being required to perform forced or compulsory labour).
(3) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not
exceeding the relevant period or a fine not exceeding the statutory
maximum, or both;
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not
exceeding 14 years or a fine, or both.
(4) 'Human Rights Convention' means the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms agreed by the
Council of Europe at Rome on 4 November 1950; 'the relevant period'
means(a) in relation to England and Wales, 12 months;
(b) in relation to Northern Ireland, 6 months.1 64
The Convention provides further obligations upon participating
countries. Article 1165 states that each member of the ILO that ratifies
the Convention shall suppress the use of forced or compulsory labor in
all forms, as soon as possible.166 As a transitionary exception, forced
labour is permitted "for public purposes only and as an exceptional
measure, subject to the conditions and guarantees hereinafter
provided,"167 with the transitional period not lasting longer than five
years. 8 Article 2169 serves to define "forced or compulsory labor"

163. See id at 7 (reprinting the Article 4 definition of "trafficking in human beings,"
specifying such means in subparagraph (a), and stipulating in subparagraph (b) that the victim's
consent "shall be irrelevant where any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) have been used").
164. Id. at 7-8.
165. Id. at 8.
166. Id. (quoting ILO Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, art. 1, cl. 1,
adopted June 28, 1930, 39 L.N.T.S. 55 (entered into force May 1, 1932) [hereinafter Forced Labour
Convention]).

167.
168.
169.

Id. (quoting Forced Labour Convention, supra note 166, art. 1, cl. 2).
Id. (quoting Forced Labour Convention, supra note 166, art. 1, cl. 3).
Id. at 8.
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which, for the purposes of the Convention, "shall mean all work or
service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any
penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself
'

70
with a narrow list of exceptions.' 7
voluntarily,"o

The United Kingdom ratified the Convention on December 17,
2008, and it came into force on April 1, 2009.172 Accordingly, the
country, which had even ratified Article 5 of the Convention in 1927,'
was placed on notice to:

-

consider adopting such legislative and other measures as may be
necessary to establish as criminal offences under its internal law, the
use of services which are the object of exploitation as referred to in
Article 4 paragraph (a) of this Convention, with the74 knowledge that the
person is a victim of trafficking in human beings.1
C.N. complained that "at the time of her ill-treatment the
Government were in breach of their positive obligations under Article 4
of the Convention to have in place criminal laws penalising forced
75
labour and servitude."s
This article provides that:

1. No one shall be held in slavery or servitude.
2. No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour.
3. For the purpose of this article the term 'forced or compulsory
labour' shall not include:
(a) any work required to be done in the ordinary course of
detention imposed according to the provisions of Article 5 of [the]
Convention or during conditional release from such detention;
(b) any service of a military character or, in case of conscientious
objectors in countries where they are recognised, service exacted
instead of compulsory military service;
(c) any service exacted in case of an emergency or calamity

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

(quoting Forced Labour Convention, supra note 166, art. 2, cl. 1).
(quoting Forced Labour Convention, supra note 166, art. 2, cl. 2 (a)-(c)).
at 9.
at 10.
at 9 (quoting Forced Labour Convention, supra note 166, art. 19).
at 12-13.
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threatening the life or well-being of the community;
(d) any work or service which forms part of normal civic
obligations. 176
Contesting C.N.'s argument, 77 the Government submitted that the

application was manifestly ill founded, and therefore inadmissible, due
to "insufficient evidence to conclude that the applicant had been
subjected to the kind of treatment prohibited by Article 4 and because

the protection afforded by English law against conduct prohibited by
Article 4 was sufficient to discharge the positive obligation on the
State."' The Court accepted this threshold question as a matter to be

determined on the merits,' 7 9 and accordingly ruled in favor of C.N., i.e.,
to admit the argument. 8 0

2. Application of CN v. United Kingdom by ECHR Through Siliadin v.
France

Leading to a verdict in her favor, C.N. submitted that the
Government did not enact domestic law provisions to criminalize Article

4 conduct, as per its positive obligation, until 2009."

Seeing that she

had made a credible allegation of ill treatment that offended Article 4 in

2006,182 the Government's delay necessarily foreclosed the possibility of
an effective investigation into her complaints of Article 4 violations, let
alone a prosecution on Article 4 grounds.' 8 3
Furthermore, the
Government confirmed to the applicant in writing that, at that time, there
was no offense known to them that encapsulated her situation.1 84
C.N. also correctly noted that the ECHR, via Siliadin v. France,
yielded useful precedents, in the form of judicial definitions by the
Court. 185 The Court used Siliadin to define servitude as "a 'particularly
serious form of denial of freedom', which included 'in addition to the
obligation to perform certain services for others . .. the obligation for the
'serf' to live on another person's property and the impossibility of
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id (quoting Forced Labour Convention, supra note 166, art. 4).
Id. at 13.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 13.
Id at 13(citing Human Rights Convention, Article 35(3)(a)).
Id. at 13.
Id
Idat 14.
Id.
Siliadin v. France, 2005-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 335, 359.
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altering his condition.""' 6 Siliadin also referred to the ILO Forced
Labour Convention in its definition of forced or compulsory labor,
which "included 'all work or service which is exacted from any person
under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not
Siliadin articulated a duty to pass
offered himself voluntarily.""8

legislation "specifically criminalising conduct falling within the scope of
Article 4 [... because a]ncillary offences which might also be
committed during the course of forced labour or servitude did not
Finally, C.N.
provide sufficient protection under the Convention."'
successfully reasoned that Section 71 (2009) proved the Government's
awareness that "there was a 'lacuna in the law' that needed to be

filled."

89

Having successfully pleaded her case before the Court, C.N. was
awarded a non-pecuniary judgment of eight thousand Euros' 90
(approximately equal to $10,175 USD on the date of judgment),' 9' an
extra payment of twenty thousand Euros for court expenses' 92

(approximately equal to $25,435 USD on the date of judgment),' 9 3 any
applicable taxes that would arise from these awards,' 94 and interest.' 9 5
This monetary award was in recognition of the fact that the United
Kingdom Government violated C.N.'s rights pursuant to Article 4 of the
Human Rights Conventionl96 ("HRC") via deficient investigationt97
despite a credible suspicion of domestic servitude,' 9 8 as well as defective
legislation' 9 9 that unduly narrowed the conditions for applicants to seek

186. C.N., No. 4239/08, at 13-14 (citing Siliadin v. France, 2005-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 335, 369).
187. Id. at 14.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 14-15.
190. Id. at 23(balancing the gravity of C.N.'s allegations, judgments from similar cases, and
the Government's genuine concerns about the petitioner's credibility). See also M.C. v. Bulgaria,
2003-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 38; K.U. v. Finland, App. No. 2872/02, at 14 (2008) available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-89964.
191.

Currency Converter, supra note 117.

192.

C.N., No. 4239/08, at 23-24.

193.

Currency Converter, supranote 117.

194. C.N., No. 4239/08, at 1, 24 (stating "plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of
non-pecuniary damage" and "plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of
costs and expenses").
195. Id (considering it "appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the
marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage
points").
196. Id. at 22.
197. Id at 18-19.
198. See id at 19.
199. Id. at 18-19.
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redress through national criminal codes. 200 The Court also noted that by
successfully proving a claim with respect to Article 4, C.N. also was
able to bring forth claims under Articles 8 and 13 of the HRC.20 1
However, the Court failed to find any issues that were separate from
Article 4 of the HRC.202
3. Comparing C.N. to Siliadin
In awarding relief to C.N., the ECHR highlighted two factual
differences between CN. and Siliadin.203 The first difference is with
respect to the applicant's age: the applicant in CN. was older than the
applicant in Siliadin.2 04 The second difference is that while Siliadin
implicated the conduct of a direct employer, CN. claimed that "it was an
agent - and not her 'employers' - who she claimed were responsible for
the treatment contrary to Article 4 of the [HRC]."205 A common law
jurist might be compelled to conclude that CN. "extends" Siliadin, by
noting that (1) C.N.'s older age, relative to the petitioner in Siliadin,
raises the maximum age of a forced laborer to thirty-three (33) years of
age,206 if the applicant's age should even be relevant at all, and (2) a
mere agent of an employer is not too remote from an employer to be
immune from HRC Article 4 scrutiny. The more correct conclusion to
draw is consistent with civil law: (1) The statutes' silence on age
suggests that HRC Article 4 protections 207 are guaranteed to all
applicants who allege forced labor, thereby rendering age irrelevant as a
factor, while (2) C.N affirmatively states that agents of employers are
mandated to abide by HRC Article 4 as if the agent of the employers
were the direct employer himself or herself.208
In fact, HRC Article 4 protections are of paramount importance to
the ECHR, which stressed:

-

200. Id. at 20 (noting similar inadequacies in the United Kingdom criminal code's ability to
protect Article 4 rights that the Court found in Siliadin v. France, namely that "authorities were
limited to investigating and penalising criminal offences which often - but do not necessarily
accompany the offences of slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour," leaving "[v]ictims
of such treatment who were not also victims of one of these related offences . . . without remedy.").
201. Id. at 22.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 19.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. See id. at 1, 19 (noting that the C.N. decision was rendered in 2012, and the applicant was
born in 1979).
207. Idat 37
208. See id. at 19, 22.
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. . together with Articles 2 and 3, Article 4 enshrines one of the basic
values of the democratic societies making up the Council of Europe.
Unlike most of the substantive clauses of the Convention, Article 4 § 1
makes no provision for exceptions and no degradation from it is
permissible under Article 15 § 2 even in the event of a public
emergency threatening the life of a nation. 209
In its Siliadin judgment the Court confirmed that Article 4 entailed a
specific positive obligation on member States to penalise and prosecute
effectively any act aimed at maintaining a person in a situation of
slavery, servitude or forced or compulsory labour. 2 10
The ECHR's refusal to grant any exceptions towards HRC Article 4
protection frames freedoms from slavery, servitude, and forced or
compulsory labor as fundamental rights.211 On the condition that the
Nepalese migrant workers, who are currently working in Qatar in World
Cup-related construction, find a way to gain access to the ECHR as
plaintiffs, they would appear likely to be granted similar protection.
B. ProceduralBurdens
1. Assuming Availability of Access to ECHR as Plaintiffs, Can the
Nepalese Migrant Workers in Qatar Sustain the C.N./Siliadin Burden of
Proof?
As a component of C.N.'s solicitor's investigation into allegations
of forced labor, which was accepted as evidence by the ECHR in her
winning case against the UK government, the solicitor consulted with
212
the POPPY Project on December 18, 2008.
It was found that C.N.
had been "'subjected to five of the six indicators of forced labour' (as
identified by the ILO)."2 13 These six indicators are:
1. Threats or actual physical harm to the worker.214
2. Restriction of movement and confinement to the work place or to a

209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id. at 17.
Id. at 17-18.
See id. at 17.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 9 (quoting the respective ILO indicator directly in the text of the opinion).
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limited area.215

3. Debt bondage: where the worker works to pay off a debt or loan,
and is not paid for his or her services. The employer may provide food
and accommodation at such inflated prices that the worker cannot
escape the debt. 216

4. Withholding of wages or excessive wage reductions, that violate
previously made agreements. 2 17
5. Retention of passports and identity documents, so that the worker
cannot leave, or prove his/her identity and status. 218
6. Threat of denunciation to the authorities, where the worker is in an
irregular immigration status. 219
Respectively,(1) Pete Pattisson's September 25, 2013 article, 2 20 as
published in The Guardian, reports allegations that workers were on
duty in 50'C (122oF) conditions and were not granted access to drinking
water.22
Among forty-four documented deaths among the workers
between the dates of June 4 and August 8, 2013, heart attacks, heart
failure, and workplace accidents were responsible for half of these.222
Barring the workers from drinking water in such oppressively hot
temperatures while officially on work duty, with or without the presence
of colleagues' deaths, should likely be seen as, at the very least, a threat
of physical harm to the workers.
(2) Maya Kumari Sharma, the ambassador from Qatar to Nepal,
equated the working conditions as "an open jail,"223 from which about
thirty Nepalese citizens sought refuge.224 One particular Lusail Citybased worker reported being unable to search for alternative
employment, because the company refused to grant him permission to
leave.225 The fact that one ambassador cited tens of examples of citizens

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id
See Pattisson, supra note 26.
Id.
Id.

223.
224.

Envoy Sharma in soup, supra note 54.
Pattisson, supra note 26.

225.

Id
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abroad who claimed to be restricted to a limited area, such as an "open
jail," should likely give credence to this ILO indicator.
(3) Pattisson's Guardian article states that most of the Nepalese
workers obtained their jobs in Qatar through recruitment agents.226 As a
result, they are personally indebted to them, owing interest rates as high
22
as thirty-six percent.227
Instead of providing food and accommodations
at prohibitively inflated prices, Pattisson reports that employers are more
likely to withhold wages. 2 28 This should be seen as a facially obvious
case in which workers work to pay off their debts, but are not paid for
their services, echoing the respective ILO indicator. 22 9
(4) Some Nepalese workers have had their pay withheld for as long
as two months at a time.230 One particular worker, Ram Kumar Mahara,
worked a twenty-four hour shift without being provided food.23 1 When
Ram complained about this disparate working condition, the manager
terminated Ram's employment without paying the wages that were
earned.232 According to Pattisson's article, withholding of wages and
violations of previously made agreements, and, by extension, flauntings
of this respective ILO indicator, appear to be systemic.233
(5) Pattisson also reveals that employers routinely confiscate the
construction workers' passports while in Qatar and fail to issue domestic
identification that would identify the workers as such.234 Consequently,
the workers are unable to leave their places of employment, for without
any form of identification (which would probably be in the hands of the
respective employer), the otherwise lawfully-present workers would be
akin to illegal aliens. 2 35 They would be arrestable, deportable, and
unentitled to any legal protection.2 36 Given this information, it seems
likely that the respective ILO indicator is triggered here, thus
strengthening the case that systemic forced labor is in effect for the 2022
World Cup in Qatar.
(6) The Pattisson article does not appear to disclose any recorded
instance of an employer threatening to denounce a worker, as an

226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Id.
Id
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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irregular immigrant, to authorities; however, the consequences are
appreciated and feared by the workers.237 One anonymous worker was
clearly on notice, as he reasoned that "[i]f we run away, we become
illegal and that makes it hard to find a job. The police could catch us at
any time and send us back home. We can't get a resident permit if we
leave." 23 8 Though less blatant than the other five, it nonetheless can be
reasonably argued that this ILO indicator, along with the previous five,
as mentioned above, has been implicated by the construction employers.
2. Analyzing the Nepalese Workers' Likelihood of Gaining Access to
ECHR as Plaintiffs
Since all six ILO indicators seem to be present, according to
Pattisson's fact finding for The Guardian,239 this note shall, from this
point forward, assume that the migrant workers in Qatar can articulate a
primafacie claim of forced labor. CN v. United Kingdom shows that it
is possible for an alien to assert rights under HRC Article 4 merely by
being present and working in an ECHR country; 240 accordingly, similar
ECHR standing is not yet an impossibility for the Nepalese workforce in
Qatar. The next steps of this analysis are (a) to investigate whether
FIFA, as a corporation headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland (which, in
turn, is a country whose courts yield to binding opinions from the
ECHR), shall be obligated to uphold the Human Rights Convention
when doing business in a foreign country that is not under jurisdiction of
the ECHR, and (b) to determine whether or not the construction
employers can be considered agents of FIFA, since these construction
projects have arisen from Qatar's secured bid for the 2022 World Cup.
If it should be deemed that the Qatar superintendents who
employed these migrant workers from Nepal have, in fact, served as
agents of FIFA, then it would appear to be plainly obvious that FIFA
would be subject to an ECHR opinion. As a general rule, ". . . national

courts in the European Union appear to have jurisdiction over any
defendant corporation that is 'domiciled' in the European Union,
237. See id.
238. Id.
239. See generally id.
240. See C.N. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 4239/08, at 1-2 (2012), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-114518 (recalling that C.N. last lived in
Uganda before seeking a new life in the United Kingdom, and noting that C.N. entered the United
Kingdom, from Uganda, with the aid of a false passport and visa, thus logically holding that C.N.'s
lack of documented immigrant status, let alone citizenship, was not a prohibitive obstacle that
would have denied C.N. from seeking HRC Article 4 protections and redress from the ECHR).
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irrespective of where the harm occurred or the nationality of the
plaintiffs."241 As stated previously, it has already been reasoned that the
claimants' immigration status in the lex loci country is irrelevant; 242 the
Brussels Regulation serves to further concede this point.243 Because
FIFA's headquarters are located in Switzerland, any human rights
violations that should arise from FIFA business anywhere in the world
would be of interest to the ECHR. 244 The final obstacle, before being
able to surmise that the Nepalese workers would have ECHR standing, is
whether or not the Qatar employers were agents of FIFA.
With respect to this point, namely, whether the Qatar construction
employers acted as agents of FIFA, it should be fairly logical to assume
that this should be the case. After all, the Qatari soccer federation had to
place a bid and submit a formal presentation in order to be awarded the
2022 World Cup by FIFA.245 In Qatar's lobbying for the right to host
the 2022 World Cup, the nation proposed the construction of state-ofthe-art facilities for World Cup use, including stadia employing cuttingedge technologies with renewable and sustainable technology. 246 This
goal, along with Qatar's proposal of "modular" stadia 2 47 to be partially
deconstructed and reformed, in part, as a new permanent stadium
elsewhere on the Asian continent,248 was one of several points in Qatar's
bid24 9 that were directly catered to FIFA's stated objectives for the
World Cup. 25 0
For these reasons, it should be held that these very projects, along
with the Lusail City construction (which is the source of many instances
of slave labor at work that The Guardian documented), were most likely
carried out because FIFA awarded Qatar the 2022 World Cup. In other
words, this construction would probably not have begun without the
promise of a World Cup, and, by extension, this construction is likely
taking place by FIFA's appointment. Beyond the initial catalysts for this
construction in Qatar, if it should be necessary to further this argument
241.

Jan Wouters & Cedric Ryngaert, Litigation for Overseas Corporate Human Rights

Abuses in the European Union: The Challenge of Jurisdiction,40 THE GEO. WASH. INT'L L.
REV. 939, 941 (2009); See Council Regulation 44/2001, art 2., 2001 O.J. (L12) 3 (EC) [hereinafter
Brussels Regulation].
242. C.N., App. No. 4239/08, at 1-2.
243. Brussels Regulation, supranote 241.
244.

See FIFA Statutes, supra note 76.

245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

Biddersfor the 2022 FIFA World Cup, supra note II.
Id.
Id
Id.
Id

250.

FIFA Associations, supra note 2.
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(namely, that the Qatari employers are acting as agents of FIFA) by
identifying intervening episodes of FIFA directives or oversight over
this construction, it should be noted that FIFA has reserved its rights to
monitor this very situation in Qatar.25 1 On at least one occasion, FIFA
has demanded written reports from Qatar in advance of a European
Parliament hearing in the matter of the slave labor force,252 and FIFA has
been attempting to create more favorable conditions for the slave
workforce.253
V. FIFA'S RESPONSE TO IMPROVE WORKING CONDITIONS
After Mr. Pattisson's The Guardian article, FIFA demanded that
Qatar submit a report as to how workplace conditions would improve,
and set a deadline at February 12, 2014 for this notice.25 4 Though the
resulting
fifty-page
document, 255 entitled "Workers'
Welfare
25 6
Standards,"
("WWS") appears to be largely confidential and
inaccessible to the public (which is arguably consistent with FIFA's
modus operandi), various news outlets have been able to report about
what is included, and what is not, in Qatar's most recent pledge to
improve the slave laborers' welfare.
The WWS purports that going forward, employers will be
mandated to
install a telephone hotline for workers
concerns, grant workers a minimum
holiday based on a 48-hour week that
day, guarantee workers a rest day or
welfare officer posts as well as a
257
resolved.

to raise grievances and report
of three weeks' paid annual
cannot exceed eight hours per
compensate them; and create
forum for grievances to be

In addition, the WWS "[requires] contractors to set up bank
accounts for their workers, which will help facilitate payment, creating
an auditable transaction system that will help the Supreme Committee
verify that all workers are being paid in full and on time." 25 8
251. Les
Murray,
FIFA 's
Qatar
Test,
SBS
(Feb.
5,
2014),
http://theworldgame.sbs.com.au/news/l 180630/FIFAs-Qatar-test.
252. See id.
253. Id.
254. Conway, supra note 33.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. New welfare standardsfor Qatar workers, GULF TIMES (Feb. 12, 2014, 1:59 AM),
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Even though the WWS was formulated in conjunction with the
International Labour Organisation, additional concerns still remain.
James Lynch, of Amnesty International, expressed disappointment, that
"[w]hile this may be a good starting point, the [WWS] will only address
the concerns of a relatively small proportion of migrant workers in
Qatar; those involved in the construction of stadiums and training
grounds," 259 and that the scope of the WWS should be widened, in order
"to cover all the migrant workers in Qatar including those who will build
the wider infrastructure to support the hosting of the World Cup."2 6 0
The ITUC remained unimpressed with the efforts and skeptical that the
workers' conditions would actually improve, dismissing the WWS as
which has failed in the past in
"discredited self-monitoring . .
Bangladesh and other countries where thousands of workers have
died." 2 6 1

In terms of protecting the workers' rights, special attention should
be paid to the mandate that employers provide the workers with bank
accounts.
Even though it might be convenient for construction
companies to be able to point to a bank statement and show that the
workers are being paid, there is nothing to suggest that the workers will
be able to access their money. Unless construction sites erect ATM's on
site, without any form of identification, the workers will be unable to
retrieve their wages. In practice, this would undermine the promise that
workers will be able to get paid. Furthermore, supposing that ATM's
are established-so that migrant workers do not have to leave campus
without ID, effectively risking their own deportation in order to verify
that they are being paid a fair wage-what if the ATM's were to be
deemed usurious? This has been a subject of recent controversy in the
U.S.
In July of 2013, twenty-seven-year-old Natalie Gunshannon filed a
lawsuit against her employer, a Pennsylvania-based McDonald's
franchise, for undermining federal wage laws by forcing her and her coworkers to accept payments through a debit card. 2 62 This particular
JPMorgan Chase payroll card has a $1.50 charge for ATM withdrawals,
a $10 inactivity fee if unused during a ninety day period, and a seventy-

http://www.gulf-times.com/qatar/1 78/details/380896/new-welfare-standards-for-qatar-workers.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Conway, supra note 33.
262. Agnes Bedard, McDonald'sfined for illegal laborpractices, EXAMINER.COM (Feb.
19, 2014), http://www.examiner.com/article/mcdonalds-fmed-for-illegal-labor-practices.
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five cent online payment fee per transaction, among other fees. 26 3 In
general, the U.S. Department of Labor states that a pre-paid card is a
valid form of currency (instead of cash, check, or direct deposit);
however, these particular restrictions appear to unduly prevent these
employees from earning a minimum-wage "take-home pay."264
Accordingly, the DOL is studying this case, as well as a similar case in
261
New York, to determine if these lawsuits are meritorious.
Accordingly, it is reasonable to be skeptical of the WWS, and to assume
that it may be ineffective in its purported objective to improve the
working conditions of the migrant workers.
VI. PROPOSAL AND CONCLUSION

The Nepalese migrant workers (and, for that matter, all migrant
workers from all countries who have worked in Qatar on World Cuprelated construction projects) represent a unique opportunity for
international human rights litigation. These workers do not appear to be
protected, empowered, or even acknowledged by internal FIFA law
because no provisions appear to be applicable to them.266 Through this
unique situation that appears to implicate a lacuna in FIFA law, these
same workers appear to have a relatively straightforward path in pursuit
of justice.
The countries that lost their bids (in favor of Qatar's) to host the
2022 World Cup would, themselves, likely be unable to effectuate any
positive changes for the migrant workers. Efforts that incensed soccer
federations might undertake would likely include attempts to force a
relocation of the 2022 World Cup, or to hold a new vote to determine an
alternate host country, but would most likely necessarily involve filing a
267
ntd~
lawsuit against FIFA.
As noted by Samuel Morris, FIFA member
countries appear to understand that they are foreclosed from stating
causes of action in "ordinary courts of law" other than the CAS. 268
Indeed, World Cup eligibility appears to resemble a contract of
adhesion: soccer federations that are not members of FIFA are ineligible

263.
264.
265.

Id.
Id
See id.

266.

See GenerallyFIFA Statutes, supra note 76.

267.

See generally Samuel Morris, Comment, FIFA World Cup 2022: Why the United States

Cannot Successfully Challenge FIFA Awarding the Cup to Qatar and How the Qatar Controversy

Shows FIFA Needs Large-Scale Changes, 42 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 541 (2012).
268. See id at 556.
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to compete in the World Cup, and soccer federations that refuse to
accept the CAS as the exclusive "'non-ordinary' court of law" for all
legal matters (i.e., soccer federations that wish to reserve the right to
commence legal action in other courts) would not be recognized by
FIFA.269
The migrant workers do not appear to be bound by FIFA law,
because they are neither members nor representatives of a soccer
federation. 2 70 They, accordingly, should be free to pursue their cause of
action by filing in the ECHR. As Mr. Morris reasons, "[n]o party should
be subject to the jurisdiction of a court unless he or she willfully agrees
to it." 2 7 1 Not only have the migrant workers not willfully agreed to
appear in front of the CAS, no less at the exclusion of other "ordinary
courts of law," but FIFA, pursuant to its legal procedure agreement with
the CAS, allows the CAS to apply Swiss law in the event that FIFA law
should fail to address a legal issue that may arise.272 Perhaps more
importantly, Switzerland, Qatar, and Nepal, by virtue of their
membership within the United Nations, have willfully agreed to the
UDHR, which in turn is written so that every person may seek its
protections. 27 3
In finding for C.N. in CN v. United Kingdom, C.N. was awarded
the equivalent of $35,610 (paid in Euros) for her non-pecuniary damages
and legal fees, and the ECHR further declared that she should be entitled
to extra money to cover all resultant taxes and for interest that would
have accrued from the adverse events until the date of judgment.274 (In
CN, the ECHR specifically noted on the record that the UK questioned
the credibility of the applicant.2 75 Since the ECHR deemed the
government's suspicions worthy of credence, these reservations were
properly factored into the judgment. 2 76 ). If that number were simply to
be multiplied by forty-four, for the deaths that were counted in Mr.
Pattisson's article,277 then FIFA would have to pay a total judgment of
$1,566,840, plus taxes and interest. If, instead, that number were to be

269. See id. (noting that "FIFA members, including the United States, may not have much of a
choice.").
270. See id.
271. See id. at 557.
272. Id. at 554-5; FIFA Statutes, supra note 76, at 47.
273. UDHR, supranote 29.
274. C.N.
v.
United
Kingdom, App.
No. 4239/08 (2012),
23
available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-114518
275. Id.
276. See id
277. Pattisson, supranote 26.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2014

33

Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal, Vol. 32, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 5
210

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 32:177

multiplied by 185, to cover each Nepalese worker that the BBC counted
in 2014,278 then FIFA would have to pay a total judgment of $6,587,850,
plus taxes and interest. Furthermore, if C.N.'s judgment were multiplied
by 4000, to reflect Ms. Burrow's "conservative" estimate of the total
death toll for Nepal and India alone279, then FIFA should anticipate
forfeiting more than $142,000,000.
Given the facts that hundreds or thousands of claimants would have
the same cause of action against the same defendant for the same injuries
(ranging from involuntary servitude to death), while alleging similar-if
not identical-UJDHR violations, and that countless news outlets and
human rights organizations have been aware of these episodes in Qatar,
there should be fewer questions as to the applicants' credibility. This
would allow the ECHR to award each claimant's estate more money.
Considering that (1) C.N. was, arguably, treated better by her captors
than these migrant workers were treated (including, but not limited to,
the facts that C.N. did not have to deal with Qatari desert heat, and that
C.N. was not subjected to a level of hard labor comparable to that of the
migrant workers in Qatar); (2) there is evidence that the migrant
workers' conditions of servitude resemble systemic disparate treatment;
(3) the mistreatment of the migrant workers, by being inextricably linked
to an international event such as the World Cup, has more global
implications than S.'s relatively small-scale slave enterprise; and (4) the
ECHR might deem it necessary to impose an additional penalty on FIFA
in the form of punitive damages, due to the significant revenue that
World Cups raise for FIFA. It is easy to see that the ECHR could hold
FIFA liable for, on a per-person basis, an amount of money incalculably
larger than C.N.'s award. Presuming that a lawsuit should be filed in the
ECHR on behalf of all aggrieved migrant workers and the estates of all
deceased migrant workers who engaged in construction in Qatar for the
2022 World Cup, I propose that FIFA and the plaintiffs strive to reach a
settlement. Failing this, I propose that the ECHR establish jurisdiction
over this case and rule against FIFA, in order to protect the migrant
workers' interests and to uphold the UDHR.
It is my opinion that a settlement could not possibly be palatable to
the deceased workers' survivors, to the respective national governments,
and to human rights activists, unless the World Cup were to be moved to
an alternative host-country. International sporting tournaments have

278.
279.

Conway, supra note 33.
E:60: Qatar'sWorld Cup, supra note 24.
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occasionally been moved to new countries on relatively short notice.28 o
Samuel Morris notes that in response to gun violence in 2009, which
took place in Pakistan against the Sri Lankan cricket team, the
International Cricket Council ("ICC"), albeit without an adjudicated
mandate, decommissioned Pakistan as a co-host of the 2011 Cricket
World Cup. 28 1 The ICC re-assigned fourteen games, which were
originally scheduled to be played in Pakistan, to the three other host
countries: India, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh.2 82
As an additional example, the 2003 FIFA Women's World Cup was
originally slated to be held in China.28 3 Unfortunately, due to an
outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome ("SARS"), it became
necessary to find a new host country.284 On May 26, 2003, FIFA
accepted the United States' bid (over Sweden's) to relieve China of its
hosting duties, due in part to, the U.S.'s successful hosting of the
previous iteration of the Women's World Cup in 1999.285 Had the
World Cup been played in China, the schedule would have lasted from
September 23 to October 11, 2003;286 the U.S. substantively maintained
the schedule despite the sudden circumstances, starting on September
20, and ending on October 12.287 To compensate China, FIFA
reimbursed China with a one-and-a-half million dollar payment, 288
upheld China's automatic berth into the 2003 World Cup 28 9 (as is
customary for host countries), and awarded China the next Women's
World Cup-the 2007 edition.29 0
With these anecdotes, it is plainly obvious that given adequate
notice, the 2022 World Cup can be relocated, though such a move would
become increasingly complicated the longer FIFA should wait. In these
aforementioned scenarios, respective action was taken sua sponte by the

280. Morris, supra note 267, at 559.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Jere Longman, SOCCER; U.S. Replaces China As Host of Soccer's Women's World Cup,
N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/27/sports/soccer-us-replaces-chinaas-host-of-soccer-s-women-s-world-cup.html.
284. Id
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. 2003
FIFA
Women's
World
Cup,
WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2003_FIFAWomen%27s-WorldCup (last visited Feb. 25, 2014).
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tournament organizers.29 As of this writing, FIFA has beet markedly
dogmatic, stating that while Qatar should improve the workers' labor
conditions, the Middle Eastern microstate will, regardless, host the 2022
World Cup, calling the decision to hold the tournament in Qatar
"irreversible." 2 92 Samuel Morris is similarly fatalistic about a judiciary's
likelihood to vacate Qatar's bid, surmising that
although the CAS may apply Swiss law additionally to FIFA law, it
is clear from the FLFA Statutes that FIFA law will be the primary basis
for a CAS decision (internal citation omitted). This makes it impossible
for the CAS to rescind a bid award, because FIFA rules do not discuss
rescinding bids. [ ... ] There is no statute within FIFA that calls for a revote on a World Cup bid or forcibly moving it from one country to
another.293
Though I concede that this would be an unprecedented action, I
disagree with Mr. Morris's point of view. The fact that FIFA does not
have a provision for rescinding an awarded bid should not preclude
relevant Swiss law from guiding such a decision, if necessary. FIFA, as
an organization headquartered in Switzerland,2 94 should not be immune
from the ECHR, nor should any entity under the jurisdiction of a
Council of Europe member nation, which includes Switzerland.
Accordingly, I think the ECHR could, hypothetically, enjoin FIFA from
holding the 2022 World Cup if it ruled that FLFA, through agents such as
Qatari construction managers, violated the UJDHR. However, a mere
judgment barring the 2022 World Cup from taking place in Qatar would
be insufficient and potentially counterproductive, as would an order to
move it to a judicially-designated alternate country.
It can be reasonably opined that judges would rather not have to
directly oversee the operation of a sporting tournament. It is also
important to note that FLFA, of late, has consciously avowed to adopt
policies somewhat analogous to affirmative action, by attempting to
become less exclusive to Europe. In 2000, FLFA adopted a "rotation
policy," meaning that the men's World Cups were to be rotated among
the world's continents.295 2002's World Cup was in Asia (shared

291.

See infra notes 280-290.
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See Ian Traynor, Fifa says there is little it can do about labourconditions in Qatar, THE

GUARDIAN (Feb. 13, 2014, 11:33 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/13/fifalabour-conditions-qatar-world-cup.
293. Morris, supra note 267, at 559.
294. FIFA Statutes, supra note 76, at 6.
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between South Korea and Japan), 2006's was in Germany, and 2010 was
in South Africa.296 2014's was reserved for South America, and thus
when Colombia withdrew its bid, Brazil was awarded the 2014 World
Cup by default.297 Stating that default bids were undesirable, and being
satisfied with the rotation policy's results, FIFA declared, in 2007, that
2018's would be available for bidding by any country not in Africa or
South America, and that 2022 would have no geographic restrictions
upon eligible bidding countries,298 despite the fact that CONCACAF (the
region containing North America, Central America, and the Caribbean)
would thus be robbed of its exclusive window in the rotation policy. 29 9
In my opinion, these atrocious and systemic violations of the
UDHR-especially the kafala system's requirement of an exit visa in
order for a migrant worker to assert his nationality by returning to his
home country-are amplified both by FIFA's failure to address such a
scenario in its internal statutes, as well as its insistence that "ordinary
courts of law" never be allowed to have jurisdiction over FIFA affairs.
FIFA's desire to have its affairs handled internally at all costs, and by
the CAS if necessary, is understandable, bearing in mind the purposes of
competency, efficiency, and consistency, with respect to legal issues
closely related to soccer governance, players' or nations' eligibility, etc.
Qatar's use of slave labor in preparation for the 2022 World Cupwhich FIFA steadfastly maintains cannot and will not be relocated,
despite FIFA's insistence that migrant workers' labor conditions
improve-is an entirely different matter. This is an instance whereby
FIFA, despite its headquarters in Switzerland and its quoted mission that
the World Cup "touch the world, develop the game, and build a better
future through a variety of ways,"300 has purposefully attempted to
establish immunity from the ECHR. This is unacceptable. With these
numerous factors in mind, I think the ECHR should order FIFA to
establish an escrow fund, to be administered by a neutral third party,
from which survivors of the slave labor scheme in Qatar and survivors of
deceased workers can claim damages and legal fees.
Accordingly, I propose that FIFA be mandated to place fifteen
million dollars into escrow for each confirmed deceased migrant worker
who was victimized by slave labor in Qatar, and ten million dollars into
296. FIFA ends World Cup rotation policy, CNN.COM (Oct. 29, 2007, 10:03 PM),
http://edition.cnn.com/2007/SPORT/football/10/29/switzerland.cup/.
297. Id.
298.

See Rotation ends in 2018, supra note 295.

299.
300.

FIFA ends World Cup rotationpolicy, supra note 297.
FIFA Associations, supra note 2.
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escrow for every confirmed migrant worker who was denied a companyissued ID card, and who was therefore left without documentation and
liable for deportation without due process. However, for the sake of
proposing a condition that FIFA might find palatable, I would offer that
if FIFA were to relocate the 2022 World Cup on or before July 31, 2016,
the ECHR might give FIFA a partial refund as it may deem appropriate.
Assuming a relocation for 2022, I would encourage that Qatar retain its
automatic bid in the 2022 World Cup, no matter where the tournament
should eventually be played, to be consistent with FIFA policy in 2003
for the Chinese women's team.
If FIFA were to insist on keeping the 2022 World Cup in Qatar, I
would suggest that the ECHR mandate that at the conclusion of the
games, some removable seats from the "modular stadia" be sold at
auction to private memorabilia collectors, with proceeds to further
benefit the victims and their families. Subsequently or alternatively, I
would propose that the modular stadia be rebuilt in countries that saw its
citizens perish in the Qatari slave labor regime, especially Nepal. Of
course, should FIFA refuse to relocate the 2022 tournament, further
violations in Qatar could also be judiciable, and damages would likely
be even greater, as a pattern of purposefully adverse conduct would have
been established from an initial ECHR judgment. It is assumed that
FIFA would eventually decide against collecting additional liability and
negative publicity.
Soccer is nicknamed, among worldwide fans, "The Beautiful
Game." 30 1 The carnage that has been rotting in Qatar is surely a black
eye for FIFA, and the fact that slave labor has persisted as long as it has,
in preparation for the 2022 World Cup, should have raised many red
flags, and quicker than has actually occurred. The conduct of these
Qatari employers-as-slave masters, as well as FIFA's willful ignorance
to the conduct it arguably endorses, is squarely out of bounds.
Accordingly, the Qatar bid should finally be given the red card.
Whether or not such action shall take place, the ECHR should serve as
the referee, despite FIFA's inevitable insistence that its "rulebook" only
calls for the services of the CAS and its interpretation of FIFA statutes.
Swift and sensible action must be taken as soon as possible, in order for
FIFA to net a salvaging of the 2022 World Cup, to honor the memory of
the deceased migrant workers, and to preserve the basic fundamental
human rights of survivors of the Qatari desert, as securing them for
301. Peter Bella, Soccer the Beautiful Game, INTERESTING CHICAGO (June 22, 2014, 9:35
P.M.), http://www.chicagonow.com/interesting-chicago/2014/06/soccer-the-beautiful-game/.
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everyone is the UDHR's ultimate goal.
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